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The recent literature on reasoning biases in psychosis and delusions is reviewed. The state-of-the-art knowledge
from systematic reviews and meta-analyses on the evidence for jumping to conclusions is brieﬂy summarised,
before a fuller discussion of the more recent empirical literature on belief ﬂexibility as applied to delusions.
The methodology and evidence in relation to studies of belief ﬂexibility and the Bias Against Disconﬁrmatory
Evidence (BADE) across the delusional continuum will be critically appraised, and implications drawn for
improving cognitive therapy. It will be proposed that dual process models of reasoning, which Kahneman
(Kahneman, 2011) popularised as ‘fast and slow thinking’, provide a useful theoretical framework for integrating
further research and informing clinical practice. The emergence of therapies which speciﬁcally target fast and
slow thinking in people with distressing delusions will be described.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Cognitive models of psychosis (Freeman et al., 2002; Garety et al.,
2007; Garety et al., 2001; Morrison, 2001) propose that beliefs and ap-
praisals play a central role in determining the clinical consequence of
psychotic experiences. The way in which individuals make sense of,
and respond to, anomalous experiences can determinewhether they re-
main benign (even life-enhancing) or alternatively result in beliefs
which are distressing and lead to impairment and a need for clinical
care (Garety and Hardy, 2017; Peters et al., 2016). This paper presents
key research ﬁndings pertaining to reasoning biases, delusional beliefs
and psychosis. The state-of-the-art knowledge from systematic reviews
andmeta-analyses on the evidence for jumping to conclusions is brieﬂy
summarised, before a fuller discussion of the emergent empirical litera-
ture on belief ﬂexibility as applied to delusions. Different ways in which
the construct of belief ﬂexibility has been studied are presented,
highlighting a recent rapprochement with other well-established theo-
retical domains; speciﬁcally ‘dual-process’ models of reasoning which
Daniel Kahneman popularised as ‘fast and slow thinking’ (Kahneman,
2011). We argue that a greater conceptual clarity in the cognitive
operations underpinning important reasoning biases will facilitate the-
ory reﬁnement and the development of more effective targeted treat-
ments for psychosis. SlowMo, a novel brief digital intervention for
fears of harm from others is presented as a recent example of a treat-
ment approach that targets reasoning biases as keymaintenance factors
in paranoia; an example of a wave of causal-interventionist approaches
to the treatment of psychosis.
2. Jumping to conclusions
A tendency in peoplewith psychosis to use fewer data to reach a de-
cision is posited to contribute to delusion formation and persistence;
thus, we have proposed that anomalous or ambiguous information is
rapidly appraised and a delusional conclusion drawn on the basis of lim-
ited evidence, andwithout a thorough consideration of alternatives or a
review of the evidence (Garety and Freeman, 2013). Systematic reviews
andmeta-analyses demonstrate a large and consistent evidence base in
over 50 studies, in which the clear majority show that individuals with
delusions and psychosismake decisions on the basis of limited evidence
in probabilistic reasoning tasks; the so-called ‘jump-to-conclusions’
(JTC) data-gathering bias (Dudley et al., 2016; Garety and Freeman,
2013; So et al., 2016). Recently, researchers have also addressed the
question as to whether this consistently replicated JTC association is
speciﬁc to delusions or a feature of psychosis more generally. This is im-
portant both theoretically and clinically, since ﬁnding speciﬁcity to
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delusions supports the proposition that this reasoning bias contributes
directly to the way psychotic experiences are appraised, increasing the
likelihood of delusion occurrence. A narrative review of 61 studies of
JTC by Garety and Freeman (2013) concluded that the JTC bias is likely
to be speciﬁcally associated with delusions. However, given issues of
study heterogeneity and sample selection, meta-analytic approaches
may assist further in attempting to resolve this question. An early
meta-analysis (Fine et al., 2007) reported a reliable association between
JTC and delusions. In contrast, So et al. (2016) reported that due to lack
of suitable, sufﬁciently powered group comparisons (i.e. comparison of
JTC in groups with a diagnosis of schizophrenia with vs. without delu-
sions) they could only conclude that “JTC bias is consistently evident
in psychotic groups with varied symptom proﬁles” (p. 161). JTC was
however not associated with other psychiatric diagnoses (notably de-
pression) suggesting that it is not a transdiagnostic process. In another
recent large-scale meta-analysis, Dudley et al. (2016) replicated the
key conclusion of So et al. (2016), reporting clear evidence that people
with psychosis make decisions on the basis of less information, with
the odds of JTC in psychosis being between 4 and 6 times higher than
in healthy participants and participants with nonpsychotic mental
health problems, respectively. These authors also included an analysis
of samples split into thosewith versuswithout delusions and concluded
that JTC bias was linked to a greater probability of delusion occurrence
in psychosis (k = 14, N = 770, OR 1.52, 95% CI 1.12, 2.05). Another re-
centmeta-analysis (McLean et al., 2016) provided further evidence that
groups with a diagnosis of schizophrenia with current delusions
showed more JTC than those without (with a small effect size). In addi-
tion, it has been proposed that JTC is a trait representing vulnerability to
delusions (Garety and Freeman, 2013; Dudley et al., 2016). The grounds
for this are that the JTC bias, in attenuated form, has also been observed
in those recovered from delusions (Peters et al., 2006), is associated
with delusional thinking in the general population (Colbert and
Peters, 2002; Freeman et al., 2008; Van Dael et al., 2006) and observed
in those with an at high risk mental state and other at risk groups, e.g.
relatives (Broome et al., 2007; Van Dael et al., 2006).
In summary, recentmeta-analyses have nowdeﬁnitively established
the association between JTC and psychosis. There is also evidence that
this applies to risk of psychosis, predicts outcome in response to treat-
ment and there is overall moderate-strong support for the speciﬁcity
of JTC to delusions. Taken together these provide converging evidence
indicating that JTC plays a causal role in delusion development and
maintenance and therefore represents a target for both prevention
and treatment strategies. However, it should be noted that while some
longitudinal studies were included in the recent meta-analyses of
Dudley et al. (2016) andMcLean et al. (2016), both suggest that further
work demonstrating that JTC co-varies with delusions over time in
schizophrenia is required to establish a causal relationship conclusively.
3. Belief ﬂexibility: 3 strands of investigation
Early work on the JTC bias has led to investigation into the construct
of belief ﬂexibility, a term referring to the degree to which a person
demonstrates ﬂexibility regarding a strongly held (delusional) belief.
While JTC has been viewed as a data-gathering bias, the construct of
belief ﬂexibility can be viewed as a more complex meta-cognitive
(higher order) reasoning construct. It involves an individual's ability
to disengage from (‘decouple’) a strongly held (delusional) belief,
once formed, in order to engage in further cognitive operations involved
inmaking judgements under conditions of uncertainty: considering the
possibility of being mistaken; reviewing the main belief in light of
newer evidence/information (evidence integration); and generating
and considering other alternatives (Fischhoff and Beythmarom, 1983;
Hemsley and Garety, 1986). Belief ﬂexibility in the context of psychosis
has been examined in three main ways: the direct assessment of ﬂexi-
bility in reasoning about delusions; delusion-neutral tasks assessing a
postulated Bias Against Disconﬁrmatory evidence; and dual process
models of reasoning. We will consider each in turn.
1. Belief Flexibility as reasoning about delusions. Early work conducted
byGarety and colleagues emerged from the development of a clinical
research assessment of strongly held (delusional) beliefs; The
Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Schedule (Wessely et al., 1993).
While this work was inﬂuenced by earlier psychological theory in
the area of decision making under uncertainty (Fischhoff and
Beythmarom, 1983; Hemsley and Garety, 1986; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974), theMADS was designed to provide a comprehen-
sive assessment of delusions and the ways in which individuals rea-
soned about their psychotic experiences and beliefs. From this early
work, together with the development of the Explanations of Experi-
ences (EoE) interview assessing Alternative Explanations (Freeman
et al., 2004), we deﬁned belief ﬂexibility as themetacognitive capac-
ity of reﬂecting on one's own beliefs, changing them in the light of
reﬂection and evidence, and generating and considering alternatives
(Garety et al., 2005). The assessment typically comprises 1)
accepting the possibility of being mistaken (PM) 2) the ability to
identify an alternative explanation (AE) to ones' own (delusional)
belief, and 3) changing conviction in response to a hypothetical con-
tradictory scenario (RTHC) (Garety et al., 2005; So et al., 2012).
The literature on belief ﬂexibility and delusions is more recent and
less well developed than that for JTC, and accordingly a smaller
number of empirical studies using this approach are reported. Belief
ﬂexibility (given its origins) has been discussed almost exclusively in
the context of reasoning about delusional beliefs (although see
Colbert et al., 2010 andWard et al., 2017 for exceptions). Lack of be-
lief ﬂexibility is commonly reported in people with delusions, with
rates of inﬂexibility on the commonly used PM item (MADS;
Wessely et al., 1993) typically around 50% of people (Garety et al.,
2005; So et al., 2012). Alternative explanations are found in around
a quarter of people while absence of AE is associated with more
anomalous experiences and higher JTC (Freeman et al., 2004), sug-
gesting a route bywhich these processes interact in the development
of a delusional belief. Exploratory factor analysis has conﬁrmed that
the three items yield a stable factor (So et al., 2012). However from
a theoretical perspective, responses potentially involve different un-
derlying cognitive operations (for example accepting the possibility
of being mistaken requires ‘decoupling’ from the belief while gener-
ating an alternative explanation requires additional idea generation,
involving ‘mental simulation’ and ‘holding in mind’ of a dual repre-
sentation). One investigationwhich examined beliefﬂexibility biases
in people with persecutory andwith grandiose delusions, found that
while common in association with both delusion types, they are
more strongly associated with grandiose delusions (Garety et al.,
2013b). Theseﬁndings suggest relationships between beliefﬂexibility
and emotional processes.
2. The Bias against Disconﬁrmatory Evidence (BADE; Moritz and
Woodward, 2006; Woodward et al., 2006) represents a related but
somewhat narrower construct than belief ﬂexibility as deﬁned
above, in that it concerns a hypothesised bias in the evaluation of
disconﬁrmatory evidence. The rationale for the development of an
assessment of BADE (Woodward et al., 2006) was that the other
key reasoningbiases proposed for delusional beliefs (JTC, attribution-
al and Theory ofMind biases) had been demonstratedwith delusion-
neutral material and therefore separated from the symptom itself,
while belief ﬂexibility (as assessed byMADS), by deﬁnition, involves
reasoning about delusions. The BADE task was therefore developed
to examine empirically whether people with delusions exhibit a cog-
nitive bias in which they neglect disconﬁrmatory evidence (BADE)
for their beliefs – and whether this occurs with non-delusion related
content. The methodology of the BADE task has been subject to
signiﬁcant variability over time (both in terms of presentation of
materials and calculation of key dependent variables). Most typically
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however, assessment of BADE involves an ambiguous delusion-
neutral scenario (verbal or pictorial) which is then sequentially
disambiguated. A number of interpretations are presented and
rated for plausibility (typically separated into true, absurd and lure
(emotional or neutral) interpretations). Evidence of BADE is usually
deﬁned as the lower reduction in plausibility of the lure items over
time (as these initially plausible interpretations become
disconﬁrmed in stages) in those with psychosis when compared to
a comparison (healthy or other psychiatric control) group.
An association between BADE and a diagnosis of schizophrenia has
been consistently replicated, in empirical studies in comparison to
both healthy controls and other psychiatric (mostly OCD) groups.
In a further small group of studies in the general population, BADE
has been signiﬁcantly associated with subclinical delusional ideation
(Menon et al., 2013; Zawadzki et al., 2012) using the PDI (Peters et
al., 1999), and found in high vs. low schizoptypy student groups in
some (Buchy et al., 2007) but not all (Orenes et al., 2012) studies.
There have been recent calls to standardise the methodology and
adopt dependent variables drawn from factor analysis of the entire
set of plausibility ratings (Sanford et al., 2014; Speechley et al.,
2012) rather than the a priori computation of BADE (which has
varied considerably across studies). The most recent of these factor
analytic studies (Sanford et al., 2014), including a sample of 43
patients with delusions proposed two components underpinning
performance on the BADE task: ‘evidence integration’ (the degree
to which disambiguating information has been used) and ‘conserva-
tism’ (a reduced willingness to provide high plausibility ratings
when justiﬁed). The study found that only evidence integration dif-
fered between severely delusional patients and the other groups. In
contrast with a previous distinction between BADE (down-ratings
of plausibility on lure items) and a Bias against Conﬁrmatory
Evidence (BACE; uprating of plausibility on true interpretation),
response to both lure and true items loaded on to the ‘Evidence inte-
gration’ component i.e. the groupwith current delusions gave higher
ratings for disconﬁrmed (lure) interpretations and lower ratings for
conﬁrmed (true) interpretations. Overall the authors suggest that
difﬁculties in integration of evidence (both conﬁrmatory and
disconﬁrmatory) may be important in understanding the develop-
ment andmaintenance of delusions. The further question of speciﬁc-
ity of BADE to delusions has been challenging to answer, with
inconsistent ﬁndings, likely to reﬂect at least in part the variability
in terms of task and sample selection. The only available meta-
analysis (McLean et al., 2016), concluded in favour of a speciﬁc asso-
ciation with delusions (with a small effect size). However a number
of the included studies (total n= 8)may suffer frommethodological
weaknesses in not being a priori designed to address this question
and the adequacy of themethods used to determine group allocation
(particularly in identifying comparison groups of individuals with
schizophrenia butwithout current delusions; see also So et al., 2016).
In addition to the methods and tasks discussed here to assess Belief
ﬂexibility and BADE, a number of self-report measures have been de-
signed to tap overlapping constructs. In particular, the Beck Cognitive
Insight Scale (Beck et al., 2004), deﬁnes cognitive insight as an ability
to distance from distorted beliefs and misinterpretations, reappraise
them, and to recognize erroneous conclusions. It comprises two do-
mains: ‘Self-Reﬂectiveness’, captures the willingness to acknowledge
fallibility, consider alternate explanations, and recognize dysfunctional
reasoning while ‘Self-Certainty’, taps overconﬁdence in current beliefs
and judgments. Similarly the Cognitive Biases Questionnaire (Daalman
et al., 2013) and the Davos Assessment of Cognitive Biases Scale
(DACOBS; (van der Gaag et al., 2013) include self-report items related
to reasoning biases. These self-report questionnaires assess self-aware-
ness of and, in some instances, a preference for certain reasoning pro-
cesses. Studies employing these measures are generating ﬁndings of
interest, e.g. in terms of relationships with ‘insight’ in psychosis
(O'Connor et al., 2017). However we restrict our focus in the present
paper to reasoning assessed ‘in action’ rather than by self-report, given
that many of the processes we are considering here operate at least
partly outside of conscious awareness (Evans and Stanovich, 2013).
3. Thinking fast and slow: two process models of reasoning
Within cognitive psychological theory, dual process models of
human reasoning posit two parallel systems or processes underpin-
ning decision-making, involving the following key distinction:
Type 1: fast, high capacity, independent of working memory and cogni-
tive ability
Type 2: slow, low capacity, heavily dependent on working memory and
related to individual differences in cognitive ability. (see e.g. Epstein,
1994; Evans and Over, 1996; Evans and Stanovich, 2013;
Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich and West, 2000)
Kahneman (2011) popularised this distinction in his book ‘Thinking,
fast and slow’. It is apparent that JTC may reﬂect the operation of
Type 1 fast processes while belief ﬂexibility (i.e. an ability to step
back, consider the possibility of being mistaken and reﬂect on alter-
native explanations) overlaps substantially with the construct of an-
alytic, controlled ‘Type 2’ reasoning. Epstein's Cognitive-Experiential
Self-Theory (CEST) and associated dual process nomenclature of ‘ex-
periential/intuitive’ (emotion based) and ‘rational’ systems (Epstein,
1994; Epstein et al., 1996) also adopts this key distinction although
important theoretical differences exist within those advocating
dual-process theories and Evans (2011) has argued for a shift from
a systems view to a focus on dual processes. In a joint paper, Evans
and Stanovich (2013) have articulated a Default interventionist posi-
tion which is consistent with the heuristics and biases research pro-
gramme of Kahneman (e.g. (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974). Default Interventionism is the view that reason-
ing and decision-making sometimes requires both (a) an override
of the default (type 1) intuition and (b) its replacement by effective
Type 2, reﬂective reasoning. The issue of ‘override’ has clear rele-
vance to the construct of belief ﬂexibility as applied to delusional
thinking, which was originally conceptualised explicitly as an over-
ride process, comprising reviews ofmore rapid and immediate judg-
ments. Evans has further argued for the potential need to distinguish
processes that are responsible for resource allocation and conﬂict
resolution between types 1 and 2 thinking (Evans, 2009). These pro-
cesses serve a similar function to Stanovich's (2009) ‘reﬂectivemind’
which itself follows on Daniel Dennett's (1996) ‘Kinds of minds’ the-
ory (outlining functioning of the autonomous, algorithmic and re-
ﬂective minds). Default Type 1 processing is viewed as the
exclusive domain of the autonomous mind while the reﬂective and
algorithmic minds play separate roles within type 2 processing.
The reﬂective mind has a higher order regulatory function and is re-
lated to ‘thinking dispositions’, while the algorithmic mind is associ-
ated with individual differences in cognitive ability e.g. ﬂuid
intelligence and workingmemory (Stanovich, 2009). A key putative
operation of the reﬂective mind is to send out a call for the algorith-
mic mind to engage in hypothetical thinking. To enact hypothetical
thinking, the algorithmic mind engages an initial process of cogni-
tive ‘decoupling’ (i.e. generating and sustaining a secondary repre-
sentation), which is effortful, commanding cognitive resources, and
loading heavily on working memory (Evans and Stanovich, 2013).
4. Fast and slow thinking: an integration
The evidence summarised above on JTC and data gathering, belief
ﬂexibility and evidence integration points convincingly to the presence
of characteristic reasoning biases in psychosis and delusions. However,
the literature on JTC and the different ways of conceptualising belief
ﬂexibility in psychosis are currently disparate, both theoretically and
empirically. Dual process models, with the constructs of thinking, fast
and slow, popularised by Kahneman (2011), offer scope for integrating
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the literature on JTC (an aspect of fast thinking) with that on belief ﬂex-
ibility and BADE, which can clearly be construed as the failure of the ac-
tivation and/or the effective operation of ‘slow’ thinking. This work
therefore brings us full-circle given the early inﬂuence of the work by
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) on the construct of belief ﬂexibility
and the development of the MADS, and offers important opportunities
both in terms of clinical practice and theory development. We have
found that this distinction of thinking fast and thinking slow is a heuris-
tic with clear face validity and readily comprehensible to clinicians and
individualswith psychosis alike. In this view, reasoning in the context of
distressing delusions might involve an over-reliance on the autono-
mous mind (i.e. type 1 ‘fast thinking’ including JTC), together with a re-
duced ‘call to hypothetical thinking’ (type 2) from the reﬂective mind
(involving, for example, a reﬂectivemind preference for intuitive rather
than analytic thinking) combined with deﬁcits in the algorithmic mind
associatedwithworkingmemory (i.e. difﬁculties in sustaining dual rep-
resentations, generatingnovel ideas and engaging inmental simulation/
thought experiments), ultimately manifesting the reduced belief ﬂexi-
bility noted above. Putmore simply, an over-reliance on fast Type 1 rea-
soning processes together with a reduced likelihood of the activation of
override by slow Type 2 processes, provides the context within which
the distressing beliefs are maintained and even strengthened over
time (see Fig. 1). This ﬁgure represents a simple schematic representa-
tion to show how dual-process reasoning and reasoning biases may in-
ﬂuence appraisals within more comprehensive cognitive models of
psychosis (Garety et al., 2001; Garety et al., 2007; Morrison, 2001;
Freeman et al., 2002)). Readers are directed to descriptions of these
models for fuller accounts of the complex interactions of such cognitive
factors with other psychological, social and biological factors in the for-
mation and maintenance of psychosis.
Researchers have started to apply dual process frameworks to exam-
ine reasoning across the psychosis continuum. In studies with non-clin-
ical populations, modest positive correlations have been found between
experiential reasoning and paranormal and superstitious beliefs and
schizotypy, with rational reasoning showing the converse relationship
(Aarnio and Lindeman, 2005; Freeman et al., 2012; Wolfradt et al.,
1999). In an early study, Freeman et al. (2012) found that a perceived
reliance on experiential reasoning is associated with paranoid thinking
in the general population, while reliance on deliberation (rational rea-
soning) is associated with fewer paranoid thoughts. A follow-up to
this study (Freeman et al., 2014) replicated the association within a
large non-clinical group (n=1000) between rational reasoning and re-
duced paranoia but not between experiential reasoning and increased
paranoia. It should be noted that most studies in this area have, to
date, used self-report measures of dual-process reasoning, most com-
monly the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Epstein et al., 1996), since
there have been no suitable in vivo methods for assessment. Such
methods may however be limited by these processes operating outside
conscious awareness, as we noted above. Indeed the study by Freeman
et al. (2014) found that patientswith delusions (n=30) reported lower
levels of both experiential and analytic reasoning than the non-clinical
individuals (effect sizes small to moderate) and they proposed this
might relate to reduced conﬁdence in, or awareness of, reasoning pro-
cesses within the clinical group. Recently Ward et al. (2017), therefore
developed a method of rating dual-process reasoning in vivo and used
this to examine explanations of anomalous experiences in people with
psychotic experiences with vs. without a ‘need for care’. It was found
that marked observed use of experiential reasoning was associated
with the presence of psychotic experiences in both groups while higher
levels of active rational reasoningprocesses, togetherwith anabsence of
JTC, emerged as a potential protective factor against the development of
need-for-care in the context of persistent psychotic experiences.
Adopting a different approach involving a deductive reasoning task,
Speechley et al. (2010) found that individuals with delusions fail to
use conﬂict to modulate towards ‘Stream 2’ (equivalent to Type 2 rea-
soning) when two streams of reasoning arrive at incompatible judg-
ments, proposed as preliminary evidence of a Dual-Stream
Modulation Failure model of delusion formation and maintenance.
The ﬁndings of these clinical and non-clinical studies, despite being
few in number and at an early stage of methodological development,
provide some supporting evidence for the relevance of dual-process
models in psychosis; in particular suggesting that slower, analytic rea-
soning may be protective against the development of paranoia while
over-reliance on fast, experiential (emotion-based) reasoning may be
associated with unusual (delusional) beliefs and paranoia across the
psychosis continuum.
5. Clinical implications
What are the clinical implications of this strong evidence for a rela-
tionship between reasoning biases and distressing delusional beliefs?
Relevant to this question are the ﬁndings that while JTC predicts change
in acute (Menon et al., 2008; So et al., 2014) and ﬁrst episode (Dudley et
al., 2013) psychosis, both JTC and belief ﬂexibility have been shown to
remain unchanged by standard CBT or by medication (Brakoulias et
al., 2008; Garety et al., 2008; Menon et al., 2008; So et al., 2012; So et
al., 2010). Furthermore, an early ﬁnding that has since been replicated
is that presence of belief ﬂexibility predicts change in response to cogni-
tive behavioural therapy for psychosis (CBTp) i.e. more change occurs if
the person has some ﬂexibility; a ﬁnding that extends to response to
medication (Brett-Jones et al., 1987; Chadwick and Lowe 1990; Sharp
et al., 1996; Garety et al., 1997; So et al., 2012). Aswell as being a predic-
tor of outcome, belief ﬂexibility has been found to mediate change in
paranoia (Garety et al., 2015). Overall these ﬁndings suggest that
Fig. 1. A schematic representation of ‘Thinking, fast and slow’ as it applies to distressing beliefs about others (paranoia).
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while current psychological therapies are not adequately tackling these
reasoning biases, they remain as treatment targets. This is important be-
cause it provides the rationale for a ‘causal-interventionist’ approach to
improving therapy effectiveness, which involves developing tailored in-
terventions to target the speciﬁc mechanisms that research has shown
to play a causal role in the problem to be treated (Freeman, 2011;
Freeman et al., 2016; Mehl et al., 2015).
In this context, systematic attempts to ameliorate reasoning in peo-
ple with psychosis have started to emerge internationally, in particular
group-based metacognitive training (MCT; Moritz et al., 2013) devel-
oped in Germany, with a strong focus initially on JTC as a key reasoning
bias. More recentlyMCT has been expanded to target a broader range of
reasoning biases and also to add individual training sessions, MCT+,
with some encouraging results for delusion change (Eichner and
Berna, 2016; Moritz et al., 2014). However, the two largest RCTs of
group MCT have not demonstrated consistent changes in reasoning
(Moritz et al., 2013; van Oosterhout et al., 2014). A recent RCT of
individualised MCT (MCT+) also found limited evidence of change in
thinking processes and some improvements in delusions which were
not, however, sustained at follow up (Andreou et al., 2017). Building
on Moritz and colleagues' important work, and the literature reviewed
in this paper, we have developed a new therapeutic intervention
which aims to enhance the impact on thinking processes, by intensively
targeting JTC and belief ﬂexibility, in a series of iterations (Garety et al.,
2015; Ross et al., 2011; Waller et al., 2015; Waller et al., 2011) ﬁnally
leading to SlowMo, a protocolised individual therapy for distressing be-
liefs about harm from others. A pilot feasibility RCT of the version prior
to SlowMo found good effect sizes in both improved reasoning process-
es and reductions in distressing paranoia (Waller et al., 2015), while an
associated study demonstrated that changes in paranoiaweremediated
by belief ﬂexibility (Garety et al., 2015).
SlowMo is a novel digital therapy, which now explicitly adopts
Kahneman's normalising heuristic of ‘thinking, fast and slow’ in order
to target the reasoning biases implicated in paranoia (speciﬁcally JTC
and belief ﬂexibility). The therapy consists of eight individual, face-to-
face sessions, delivered by trained therapists, assisted by a website
with interactive personal accounts and exercises. Initial sessions involve
building the meta-cognitive skill of noticing thoughts (visualised as
spinning bubbles) and thinking habits. There is an emphasis on deliver-
ing normalising messages regarding the prevalence of fast thinking and
worries about others in the general population. People learn that while
everyone thinks fast at times and this can be useful, thinking slow can
be helpful in dealing with stress and worries about other people. This
key principle frames the sessions where people are supported to try
out tips to slow down for a moment, e.g. by considering the impact of
mood and past experiences on worries and looking for safer alternative
explanations. Personalised session content (including a visual
formulation screen created by the person) is synchronised with a
mobile app to assist therapy generalisation into daily life. The mobile
app has been designed to optimise type 2 thinking, offering a real-
time ‘default-intervention’ on the rapid type 1 reasoning, characteristic
of paranoia (see Fig. 2). It is hoped that the appmay in someways act as
a kind of ‘extended mind resource’, which encourages allocation of re-
sources to type 2 processing (a key function of the reﬂective mind)
while also reducing the cognitive load on the algorithmic mind by pro-
viding ready access to a repository of alternative safety ideas, previously
generated in therapy sessions (in the form of easily accessible alterna-
tive explanations and safer thoughts). This novel digital therapy has
been developed in collaboration between service users, designers, re-
searchers and clinicians. We have recently commenced a large-scale
randomised controlled trial, see http://slowmotherapy.co.uk/ which
aims to test the efﬁcacy of this therapy for paranoia and also to test
the hypothesised mechanism that it works by helping people to slow
down their thinking i.e. by making greater use of ﬂexible, type 2
thinking.
6. Areas for future research
Reasoning and psychosis is an active and productive research ﬁeld,
generating new theoretical and clinical developments. Much more
however remains to be systematically explored. We propose three
priorities:
1. Understanding the relationship between reasoning biases and
neurocognition
Elucidating the role of neurocognition in clinical psychosis and spe-
ciﬁcally its relationship with reasoning is an important but complex
issue. We would argue that to date there is a lack of well-powered
research using adequate assessment batteries designed to assess
the role of cognitive capabilities and deﬁcits in these aspects of rea-
soning. Little if any work in this area involving belief ﬂexibility
(and indeed dual process reasoning) related to psychosis has been
conducted, while BADE task ﬁndings have been inconsistent.
Buonocore et al. (2015) as part of a randomised trial looking at the
effect of combining group-based MCT with cognitive remediation
therapy (CRT), reported signiﬁcant correlations between BADE base-
line performances and several cognitive domains associatedwith the
frontal executive functions (including cognitive ﬂexibility, working
memory and Verbal Fluency). However BADE improvements over
time were not associated with improvement in neurocognitive
performance (or indeed psychopathology), which was taken as evi-
dence of differential treatment effects for the MCT and CRT. While
Riccaboni et al. (2012) also reported correlations between BADE
performance and executive functions Moritz et al. (2010) found no
Fig. 2. The dual-process treatment rationale of SlowMo therapy-activation of the override of default type 1 (fast) thinking by Type 2 (slow, analytic thinking).
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correlation between BADE scores and performance on the Trail-
making Task (an assessment of executive functioning) with the con-
clusion that BADE reﬂects inﬂexibility towards beliefs rather than
problems with set-shifting. With regards to JTC, initial attempts to
address this issue have been conducted (Garety et al., 2013a) with
the results suggesting that this bias is associated with impairments
in working memory (as opposed simply to global impairment in
IQ), which can be understood in terms of deﬁcits related to the func-
tioning of the algorithmic mind in the discussion above (Section 4).
Other studies where the role of neurocognition (most commonly IQ
pro-rated from a short assessment) is analysed commonly adopt
ANCOVA or related methods, with some reporting that the contribu-
tion of JTC to delusions becomes non-signiﬁcant after controlling for
intelligence (see for example Van Dael et al., 2006). It should be
noted that these commonly used statistical methods have been
questioned as a valid method for attempting to ‘equalise’ pre-
existing groups on real group differences such as those likely to be
observed for example in IQ between psychosis groups and healthy
controls (for discussion of this issue see Miller and Chapman,
2001). Therefore we would recommend that future research in this
important area is carefully designed both in terms of the assessment
battery and the statistical approach.
2. The role of social processes and context in reasoning
The relevance of the literature on reasoning and decisionmaking has
been recognised from the early work on the development of the
MADS (Wessely et al., 1993). However there has been less consider-
ation of dual-process theory as applied to social processes, despite its
importance within the domain of social psychology (see e.g. Bargh
andWilliams, 2006; Chaiken and Trope, 1999). Potentially important
interactions between reasoning and social processes are suggested
by the ﬁnding of Jolley et al. (2014) that individuals with psychosis
with caregivers were nearly three times more likely to show ﬂexibil-
ity and ﬁve times more likely if the caregiving relationship was
characterised by ‘low expressed emotion’. A paradox within psycho-
sis is that although the individual may encounter extreme social
isolation and exclusion in daily life, the experiences themselves can
be viewed as fundamentally social in nature. While there has been
increasing interest in considering the social communication inherent
in voice-hearing (see Bell, 2013; Deamer and Wilkinson, 2015;
Wilkinson and Bell, 2016; Woods et al., 2014) along with a new
wave of explicitly relational therapies (Corstens et al., 2012; Craig
et al., 2015; Hayward et al., 2009; Leff et al., 2014), there has been a
lesser focus in the context of paranoia despite the typically social
themes and apparent involvement of the representation of ‘social
agents’. Indeed, recently a so-called Argumentative Theory of
human reasoning (Mercier, 2016; Mercier and Sperber, 2011) has
proposed that themain function of all reasoning is to exchange argu-
ments with others i.e. reasoning (with all of its inherent heuristics
and biases) can be viewed as a fundamentally social exercise. Re-
connecting the literature on psychosis and the dual process model
of reasoning with general social-cognitive theories may lead to
beneﬁts for the understanding of reasoning in psychosis as a social
or relational process and reciprocal beneﬁts for general theories of
social cognition (Bell et al., 2017) with important implications for
research and for psychological and indeed social interventions.
3. Delineating cognitive operations underlying reasoning biases
Psychosis involves complex multi-modal phenomena and reasoning
in the context of paranoia is likely to involve a complex interplay of
cognitive, emotional and social and biological processes competing
and combining to produce observed behaviour. Attempts to connect
different levels of explanation are likely to beneﬁt from a more ﬁne-
grained understanding of the cognitive processes underlying task
performance of reasoning in action. Lacking from our account at
this stage is consideration of the potentially important role of
emotion regulation which has also been formulated within a dual-
process framework involving a distinction between implicit and
explicit emotion processing (see for example Gyurak et al., 2011).
Employing a dual process model provides a helpful theoretical
framework which integrates the disparate psychosis research ﬁnd-
ings discussed above. Thiswill also be important for thedevelopment
of targeted approaches to reasoning biases. Further work in this area
would also inform an understanding of who might be more likely to
beneﬁt from such approaches (i.e. the personalisation question). As-
sessment of individual differences in both preferences for the dual
process reasoning styles and underlying cognitive operations (e.g.
workingmemory and executive functioning)may aid in tailoring ap-
proaches to the needs and abilities of the individual. It may also help
in understanding the optimal conditions for activating the reﬂective
mind, which allocates resources to type 2, slower thinking, and
whether this can be facilitated in the ﬂow of everyday life for exam-
ple by the use of digital technology (such as the SlowMo app).
7. Conclusion
There is now compelling evidence that reasoning biases are impli-
cated in psychosis and particularly important in the development and
maintenance of delusions including paranoia. We have presented evi-
dence on the key biases relating to reasoning ‘in action’ and proposed
that these can be understood within Kahneman's distinction between
‘thinking, fast and slow’. This framework has clear clinical utility and af-
fords opportunities for engagementwith a broader theoretical terrain in
the ﬁeld of decision-making, reasoning and social psychology. It is also
informing a new wave of targeted treatments. We have introduced
one such targeted approach, our own SlowMo therapy, which uses dig-
ital technology to target JTC and belief ﬂexibility in an attempt to facili-
tate slower, more reﬂective thinking when people need it most – in the
ﬂow of their daily life.
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